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Abstract 
This paper is essentially an introduction to the use of multivariate time series analyses of the 
Northern Irish conflict from 1969-1981.It draws on the conceptual work of Paul Smoker to 
describe systemic conflict relationships between all the parties to this conflict. Using some of 
the most comprehensive statistical documentation ever compiled on an internal conflict, the 
authors present an innovative methodology to show the highly structured nature of this 
conflict over a long period of time. The paper and its ancillary web sites present not only the 
data archive, but also the univariate, bivariate and multivariate time series programmes used to 
make the analyses. The outputs are presented in the form of descriptions of associated 
influence or ‘systemograms’ which can describe the dynamic and changing conflict ecology 
where apparently disparate conflict behaviour such as house searches, plastic bullet firings and 
the killing of military personnel, are highly correlated. 
Measures of autocorrelation are used to suggest a loss of freedom in the actions of 
particular conflict participants. Particular attention is given to the use of “less-lethal weapons” 
and their impact on overall conflict dynamics. What emerges is that sectarian killings form a 
distinct conflict susbset, whereas the counter-insurgency behaviour of the state security forces 
act as a conflict driver, ratchet ting up the conflict as each more severe phase of the counter-
insurgency programme is introduced. The paper attempts to introduce a whole systems 
conflict approach which is both dynamic and puzzling, since in many respects it indicates co-
operation between the various participants to carry on the conflict at a systemic level. The 
provisional lessons of this study are that sub-state  conflict control measures can prove 
dysfunctional. The work is very much a case of research in progress and the findings remain 
tentative. We are re-introducing it at this time since it does open the prospect of repeating the 
research methodology in other sub-state conflicts such as Israel and Iraq, if reliable data were 




 The roots of this paper lie in work undertaken at the Richardson Institute, at the 
University of Lancaster, nearly thirty years ago. Research reported in the Journal of Peace 
Research (JPR) in 1978 outlined a series of hypotheses on how sub-lethal acts by State 
Security Forces, might dysfunctionally alter a conflict’s dynamics in ways which led to a loss 
of control (Wright, 1978). 
The challenge was to first find sufficient and accurate data on a conflict to test the 
nine hypotheses outlined in the JPR report and then to design a methodology capable of 
describing inferred causal influences.  
Fortunately, the Director of the Richardson Institute during that time, Dr Paul 
Smoker, had pioneered the use of new methodologies to examine the ways in which conflict 
processes could lock in, in regard to the Sino-Indian conflict during the Sixties (Smoker, 
1969). Smoker was a founding pioneer of quantitative and simulation approaches in peace and 
conflict research and he was willing to adapt his Sino-Indian work to the much more complex 
task of examining the interaction and associated influences of scores of variables over 
different time levels. Part of that work was written up as a PhD thesis (Wright, 1987), some of 
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(Wright, 1981) but apart from a passing reference to the work in a report for the European 
Parliament’s Scientific and Technological Options Assessment Unit on approaches to testing 
and assessing the hidden social and political impacts of technologies of political control in 
1997 (Wright 1997), the work lay moribund and too complicated and problematic to excite 
peace researchers not enthused by mathematics.  
But for 9/11 the work may have continued to gather dust. However, the new 
strategies of ignoring international law, the emergence of new polices seeking to target 
civilians and combatants together with new weapons technology and the dysfunctional effects 
of the current military containment strategies in the Middle-East including Iraq and Israel, 
provoked the authors to re-understand the challenge of attempting to quantify or even 
accurately describe inferred causal inferences in complex conflict dynamics. We offer the 
following presentation, data, programmes and analyses not as finished piece of work but as a 
demonstration or illustration of an approach to those who we hope can reassess its 
implications and limitations from a deeper undertstanding of statistics than either of the 
authors possess. In many senses this is a tribute and a plea to continue the creative work of 
Paul Smoker, whose imagination created the methodologies we are attempting to illustrate and 
apply in this study. 
 
2. Testing Hypotheses on Destabilizing Conflict Processes in Northern Ireland 
 
 The hypotheses outlined in (Wright, 1978) were originally designed to examine the 
hidden and longer term impacts of so called ‘less-lethal weapons’ such as plastic bullets – an 
area of armaments which has subsequently become much more significant as the US and other 
states develop new technologies for fighting asymmetric warfare after 9/11. 
 In short, the theory went that “In certain circumstances, the use of less-lethal 
weapons may be considered as an over corrective response. Through a cybernetic process of 
destabilizing feedback, over corrective responses can bring about an opposite effect to the one 
intended. Instead of containment, an over corrective response would lead towards an induction 
of uncontrollable conflict and further polarization. Thus attempts to control a situation with 
over corrective responses are thwarted because in effect the resulting system works against 
itself. This early study argued that the impact effectiveness of such technological\fixes would 
decline over time so that increasing amounts would be required to obtain the same powers of 
control. If powers of control \were lost in this way, then a resurgence of the phenomena under 
control might develop as the fix lost potency. If the underlying dynamics were not realized, 
reliance on ever more powerful fixes would prove counterproductive as such cycles of 
destabilization would repeat themselves. 
The paper argued that even if these hypotheses were true, it was likely that in the 
short term such weapons would appear to be an effective means of crowd control. ‘The 
possibility that they constitute a destabilizing factor in a conflict might only be revealed by a 
study which correlated their effects on a range of indicators for longer periods of time.’ One 
methodological challenge was thatb an input of aggression into a conflict by one party during 
one point in time which results in an output of retaliatory aggression at another period of time, 
the form in which this output manifests itself might be quite different from the form of input. 
The British Army in Northern Ireland had adopted startegies from their Land War 
Operations Volume 111 which were essentially ‘counter-revolutionary operations.’ A key 
concern here therefore was that if a successively more oppressive set of phased counter-
insurgency strategies comprised the software which programmed the behaviour of the 
dominant system of socio political control, then a self generating conflict could ensue. Thus 
the introduction of the second most severe phase of the counter-insurgency techniques may be 
legitimated through the waves of violent retaliation amplified by the use of less-lethal 
weapons during the first phase. Subsequently, phase two is likely to generate further dissent, 
which if handled by even more severe riot weapon deployment, may destabilize the situation 
sufficiently to legitimate the introduction of phase three and so on. The parallels with the 
current conflict in Iraq and Israel reveal similar dynamics but with rather more lethal than less 
lethal force being deployed. The concern too was similar in that if the authorities failed to 
realize the nature of this process, the entire gamut of the counter-insurgency spectrum of 
operations would be deployed in a manner tantamount to self-fulfilment. For Northern Ireland, 
even a crudse time point analysis of political killings graphed against changes in socio-
political control tactics, appeared to support this thesis (See Fig 1) 
  
 
Fig 1.  Military Counter Insurgency Phases & Political Killings In Northern Ireland 
 
3. Data Considerations 
The problem with such a crude model was that its decription was based on the changes in only 
one empirical conflict indicator, overall death count. It was fruitful in suggesting that their 
were unforeseen relationships between state and non-state conflict activities which could be 
measured. It also provide a rudimentary framework to consider such changes. It also implied  
that the influence of a conflict action may persist within a conflict system, long after the event. 
The challenge in attempting to develop even a basic holistic approach to just describing the 
Northern Irish conflict raised fundamental questions about how to select representative 
conflict indicators, how to find such data and how could substantial amounts of information on 
this conflict be presented in a meaningful way? The challenge was not just academic sionce 
any commentator on this conflict and others of its ilk is likely to draw fire because of inferred 
political bias. Paul Smoker saw a clear need for the process of interpretation to be clearly 
separated from the actual conflict description so that subjective bias could be eliminated as far 
as possible.  We decided to pick variables that characterised incidents which most people 
would regard as being symptomatic of internal war. These included activities of state security 
personnel (such as house and vehicle searches, gas and plastic bullets fired, internment; 
paramilitary activists (shooting attacks, bomb explosions, catholics assassinated, protestants 
assassinated, state security personnel (Army, RUC & UDR) killed or wounded, kneecappings 
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Taken together, these variables provide a significant measure of the Northern Ireland 
conflict’s level and intensity. The data was collected from official sources such as the 
Northern iIreland Office, and the British Army and RUC Press Offices in the form of a 
monthly breakdown from 1969-1981. The full dataset and source references is provided to this 
conference as an url for the first time (NIrishdata-check). Of course all such conflict data are 
problematic since each ‘event’ is a summation of a much richer set of conflict processes and it 
is more usual for conflict participants to disagree on conflict statistics than agree.(See 
NIRC,2003 in regard to baton round figures for example) However, it is arguable that this 
conflict is better documented than almost any other of its type and provides researchers with a 
unique framework to understand more about the conflict dynamics at work in what is now 
known as military operations operations other than war.  
4. Some Methodological Considerations 
 
 
Fig 2. High Levels Of Autocorrelation & Associated ‘Loss of Freedom’ in Riot Weapon Use 
      
    Briefly the univariate tsa enables a description of the level of influence  which any 
variable’s past behaviour exerts on that variables subsequent activity. This autocorrelation 
measure as it is termed provides an important indicator of emergent processes especially a loss 
of freedom. Highly autocorrelated behaviour is especially important since it is often associated 
with episodes where conflict participants lock in to their own conflict behaviour and become 
less responsive to actions of other conflict actors. In Fig 2 for example, a univariate time series 
analysis of riot munitions (CS gas cartridges, grenades and rubber bullets) shows not just 
highly predictable behaviour but also consistent mean level moving averages over 
considerable periods of time, as if the supply itself was the greates determinant of the number 
of sub-lethal munitions fired. 
    The bivariate tsa enables a description to be made of the influence one variable’s behaviour 
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associated with the formation of variable A are implicated in the processes associated with the 
formation of variable B. 
    The multivariate tsa  is a more complex technique created to display the extent to which one 
variable’s behaviour is implicated in the influences responsible for generating all the others, as 
it and they change over time. More precisely, it quantifies the overall connectivity of the 
influencesgenerating all the variables; a measure of the strength of particular linkages together 
with an indication of the direction of  any flows of associated influence wghich are revealed. 
Smoker designed the technique as a multivariate cluster time series analysis, that is an 
amalgam of two different techniques, i.e. a clustering procedure and a time series analysis 
procedure.The clustering procedure is essentially a form  of typal analysis derived from the 
work of McQuitty(1957). As a component of this methodology it is used to define each 
variable’s time series as a member of a type, if its behaviour is more like  the behaviour of 
other members of that type than it is like anything else. The time series components are 
derived from the works of Smoker (1969), Quenouille (1959) & Wold (1949). 
    The time series element serves to ascertain the direction and strength of any associated 
influences flowing within and between variables. The technical conventions, concepts and 
measures used to perform these measures together with the technical methodologies for 
interpreting the results are provided in our Praxis website for those who wish to undertake a 
more detailed scrutiny. (http://www.imresearch.org/PraxisCentre/NIrelandStudy). The website 
also provides detailed instruction on constructing a map of all these influences from the output 
of the multivariate tsa. This is an important element of the approach, since the descriptive 
systems map of flows of associated influences or ‘systemograms’ can then be compared with 
other conflict data to make comparisons and evaluations of the impact of policies or any 
particular episode or activity on the overall conflict dynamics.  The actual process of drawing 
out the ‘systemograms’ is laboriously time consuming. However, in 1985, a research student 
at UMIST, Tim Walker managed to semi-automate the process and this work is also available 
for anyone interested in taking the work further.(Walker, 1985) 
 
5. Mapping Key Participants Contributions To A Conflict’s Dynamics 
    Mapping out the associated influence of key indicative variables of all the representative 
participants in a conflict provides a systemic picture of the conflict and enables us to at least 
describe the level and extent to which participants are actually co-opertaing to structure and 
maintain their conflict behaviour. It also enables us to identify highl;y auto-correlated 
activities of any group which has in effect become autistic, being most influenced by their 
own behaviour rather than any of the other conflict participants. For the purpose of this study a 
complete output of systemograms for time series 24 , has been created on the associated url 
(http://www.imresearch.org/PraxisCentre/NIrealndStudy). Here we will discuss only some of 
the structures and sub-sytems emerging from a typical sequence and how this methodology 
could be applied to\other conflicts experiencing similar forms of conflict behaviour. 
    In many ways, the multivariate systemogram approach enables a broad trawl of the data sets 
to actually identify highly structured behaviour. In practice, sub-sytems emerge either between 
or within variable clusters as a consequence of undertaking this tracking exercise on the 
‘systemograms’. Variables within each sub-system develop certain patterns which sustain as 
typical features within each systemogram. These can be characterised as follows: 
 
Active Variables which have only strands of influence emanating out from them. They act on 
other variables rather than being significantly acted upon themselves; Reactive Variables  
have only strands of influence feeding into them; Mixed Variables both give and receive 
influence from other variables; Interactive Variables neither receive or give influence but 
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Autocorrelated Variables which feed a large part of their influence back into themselves 
indicating a pattern of self generation. Such variables are easy to spot in the systemograms 
since they are represented by conspicuous concentric circles or semi-circles. Eyeballing an 
illustrative systemogram sequence is perhaps the best way to understand this methodology. 
 
6. An Illustrative Systemogram Sequence 
  
 
 Fig 3 Systemogram 1 
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If the conflict time sequence contained in  
(http://www.imresearch.org/PraxisCentre/NIrealndStudy), is examined systemogram by 
s.ytemogram, it is possible to discover whether the changing influence processes between 
different variables or within variable clusters are growing stronger or weaker. The change in 
the strength of the systemic process is revealed by the change in the level of correlation over 
selected time periods. Strengthening processes are associated with an increase in the level of 
correlation, whilst processes which are weakening, exhibit a decline in the level of correlation. 
    The systemograms used here are for illustration but a full analysis can determine whether 
any political, military or NGO decision, policy or tactic is significant by empirically 
establishing when the particular ‘event’ entered the sequence. If we define the influence 
horizon of an event as being the time period limit of the systemogram when its influence is 
first felt, the relevant systemogram TP = t – n + L 
 
Where t = the chronological number of the appropriate month 
            n=the series length 
            L=the maximum time lag used  
 
For example if we are interested in discovering whether or not the decision to introduce 
internment produced a measurable influence on the dynamics of the conflict, then we can find 
the first relevant systemogram if we know the following:- 
 
t=August 1971 (=12+12+8) = 32 
n=24 (in this illustrative sequence) 
L=2 (in this particular study 
TP = 32-24 +2 = Systemogram 10 
 
    In systemogram 1, the most significant patterns of influence to emerge concern 
reactive variables, all of which are strongly autocorrelated.. These include the process 
of vehicle searches (81); house searches (75) bomb explosions (93) and shooting 
incidents (89). By systemogram 5, these processes have structured with strong links 
between them. Bomb explosions and House Searchews are mutually influencing each 
other and Bomb Explosions are actively influencing Vehicles Searched (83) Some of 
these links confirm common sense – eg its natural to up searches of vehicles if bomb 
attacks are taking place but in systemopgram 1 baton round firings are strongly acting 
on Military killed (93) This is an interesting finding since traditionally any killing of 
military personnel is usually associated with punitive house searcjhes eg not just in 
Northern Ireland but in Iraq and Israel where the military action is so sever, that 
civilian houses are destroyed. In this first sytemogram military killed is empiurically 
described as actively influencing houses searched (87 + 84) 
      By systemogram 9, CS `fired forms a separate cluster, reacting to the influence 
from Republican Internment (74 & 55); Baton Rounds are driving influence towards 
bomb explosions (75), which continues to drive influence into House Searches. The 
assassination of Protestants and Catholics has become interactively linked  (88) as 
Military Personnel Killed continues to drive influence towards Vehicles Searched 
(82) as both variables yield high levels of autocorrelation (84 and 80 respectively) 
suggesting that these aspects of the conflict processes have become self organising 
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Fig 5. ‘Lock In’ Profiles Of Northern Ireland Conflict Participants 1969-1981 
 
    If we tabulate the autocorrelated variables across the entire time sequence (Fig 5), we 
should expect a conflict ‘lock in’ when several of the different conflict participant groups 
manifest some degree of autistic behaviour as measured by highly autocorrelated variables. In 
fact a series of ‘lock ins’ emerges. At the beginning of the conflict, government searching and 
firing of CS was locked in with paramilitary bombings; shooting and killing of Army 
personnel, until time period 25. A short phase of lock in emerges from the period 25-33 and 
then another from time period 33-44 and so on. According to Stafford Beer  “this is a system 
in homeostatic equilibrium. Each part is structuring the other. So the structuring goes mutually 
on. If one part stops in this creative, evolutionary process, then the whole system breaks down. 
In Northern Ireland terms that is, the war is over” (Beer, 1980). 
    Exactly why so many of the British Army reactions developed such highly deterministic 
traits is a question which must be answered by future studies. Obviously military behaviour, 
by definition is variety reducing, whilst urban guerrilla activists depend onn their 
unpredictability and the variety increasing aspects of their behaviour to remain effective, alive 
and at large. The possibility which must be faced is that certain military doctrines are actually 
dysfunctional. 
    The presence of so much self-legitimating behaviour in the activities of military personnel 
should be of concern. Traditional counter-terrorist theory suggest such wars must be fought by 
taking out the hard men. Yet when freedom of decision is lost in the military group of 
participants on the level described above, the efficacy of such an approach to conflict 
resolution must be deeply questioned. The range of associated `activities in this process appear 
to have just as much efficacy in evolving more hard men to get. 
    Having said that, it must be acknowledged that such quantitative approaches to whole 
systems conflict analysis are fraught with difficulties and their findings can seem opaque to 
non statisticians- including most policy makers Anecdotal analyses is much easier to churn out 
and is far more accessible to sound-bite formation. Indeed this conference is very unusual in 
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models are much les well known that his weather forecasting equations – perhaps because 
with the advent of computers, his erstwhile laborious log calculations can be converted into 
understandable weather pictures that most of us can grasp. 
   So few work in these field. A 1996 analysis of terrorism research in terms of the evolution of 
a body of knowledge, identified just 32 major members of the community. (Reid, 1996). And 
the majority of these contributors make qualitative rather than quantitative contributions. Of 
course after 9/11, the media appetite for terrorist and conflict experts has been voracious but 
few new quantitative approaches are emerging except at the most basic death count level or 
the production of chronologies – many of which are open to challenge about objectivity and 
reliability. And even that is revealing since in the ongoing Iraq conflict, the coalition partners 
would appear not to be as seriously documenting non coalition casualties, or at least not 
outside the prisons where different agendas for documenting conflict activities prevail. 
    A key question is relative utility. What can such studies tell us or reveal that is not more 
accessible from more anecdotal or story based analyses? The short answer is, they can yield 
tremendous insight into the  hidden structuring of conflict processes. This is going to become 
increasingly important as the tactics and technologies being offered for asymmetrical warfare 
are destined not only to alter the casualty count but the membership of who becomes a 
designated casualty. Nevertheless, such statistical studies need to be capable of showing a 
facility for generating testable hypotheses. One of the concerns of this study has been to put 
reliable conflict data in the public domain for use by other researchers.  
  White and Falkenberg-White in a ground breaking study applied regression analysis to some 
of this data and discovered that deaths caused by Loyalist paramilitaries increased the number 
of persons killed by British Soldiers. They concluded that one explanation for this curious 
finding given that most of those killed by the Army were Catholics, might be evidence of 
“some  kind of co-ordinated activity  between Loyalist paramilitaries and members of the 
security services”. (White and Falkenberg-White, 1995). Whilst there is evidence now since 
2002 to support such claims – especially in the light of the Steakknife double agent fiasco, at 
other moments alternative agendas have emerged including protecting keep members of Sein 
Fein to ensure the peace process was not derailed (see Moloney, 2002) 
    In conclusion, we have entered` a time when public presentation and information 
management are as much a part of conflict management as implementing military theories of  
peace keeping and conflict reconciliation. During periods of military intervention, the costs of  
following a misinformed policy are huge, yet the level of effort and resources devoted to 
independent conflict assessment and monitoring activity is minuscule. During future periods 
of conflict we need to find a way of  more independently collecting the raw data of war if we 
are ever to effectively evaluate existing policies especially the new ‘wars against terror.’ 
Without such objectivity we are all prey to propaganda. The important lesson from Northern 
Ireland is that if we  are to truly understand future armed conflict dynamics, accurate data is 
paramount and there needs to be much more pressure on governments to provide it and to set 
up structures which in principle enable enough accountability for modern states to be legally 
challenged about the  veracity.of the statistical  conflict data which they gather. The challenge 
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